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Conventional wisdom suggests that compulsory voting lowers the inﬂuence of special-
interest groups and leads to policies that are better for less privileged citizens, who
often abstain when voting is voluntary. To scrutinize this conventional wisdom, I
study public goods provision and rents to special-interest groups in a probabilistic
voting model with campaign contributions in which citizens can decide how much
political information to acquire, and whether to vote or abstain. I ﬁnd that compul-
sory voting, modeled as an increase in abstention costs, raises the share of poorly
informed and impressionable voters, thereby making special-interest groups more in-
ﬂuential and increasing their rents. Total government spending and taxes increase
as well, while the eﬀect on public goods provision is ambiguous. Compulsory voting
may thus lead to policy changes that harm even less privileged citizens.
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11 Introduction
It is well known that voluntary voting leads to unequal turnout as rich and well educated
citizens are more likely to participate in elections than their less privileged compatriots.1
Lijphart (1997) and many others worry that this unequal turnout translates into ﬁscal
policies that are biased towards privileged citizens; and they argue that compulsory voting
could solve or, at least, lessen the problems of unequal turnout and biased policies. They
also reckon that compulsory voting may lower the inﬂuence of special-interest groups,
thereby “reducing the role of money in politics” (Lijphart, 1997, p. 10). Hence conventional
wisdom can still be summarized by Gosnell’s notion (1930, p. 185) that elections would be
“less costly, more honest, and more representative” with compulsory voting.
In this paper I scrutinize the conventional wisdom. I base my analysis on a probabilistic
voting model with campaign contributions similar to the models of Baron (1994), Gross-
man and Helpman (1996, 2001), and Persson and Tabellini (2000). In this model political
candidates can choose their policy platform, which consists of public goods provision and
rent payments to lobby groups. These groups can make campaign contributions to political
candidates. Informed voters base their decision primarily on policy platforms, while unin-
formed or impressionable citizens base their decision primarily on political advertisements
paid for by campaign contributions. Unlike in existing voting models with campaign con-
tributions, in my model citizens can decide how much political information to acquire, and
whether or not to participate in the election. I assume that the costs of acquiring political
information are lower for citizens with good education and high incomes. Further, citizens
also have to bear costs when voting or abstaining, respectively; and I follow Matsusaka
(1995) in assuming that the citizens’ beneﬁt from voting are the higher, the more conﬁdent
they are of their vote choice.
1Tingsten (1937, p. 155) was one of the ﬁrst to provide systematic evidence that “the voting frequency
rises with rising social standard.” Lijphart (1997) reviews many studies that document unequal turnout.
2In this model citizens with good education and high incomes are more likely to take
informed decisions when voting, and they are also more likely to participate in the elec-
tion. New compulsory voting laws or stricter enforcement of such laws increase abstention
costs. Thereby they increase electoral participation as well as the share of impressionable
voters whose vote choice depends on campaign contributions rather than policy platforms.
As a consequence of this latter change, candidates raise tax rates and total government
spending to increase rent payments to lobby groups.2 The eﬀect of higher abstention costs
on public goods provision is ambiguous in general, and negative with Cobb-Douglas pref-
erences. These changes in ﬁscal policies harm citizens with high incomes, and possibly also
less privileged citizens. In addition, all citizens who did not vote before the increase in
abstention costs suﬀer from these higher costs. Therefore, in contrast to what conventional
wisdom suggests, my model shows that compulsory voting beneﬁts special-interest groups,
but may well harm all other citizens in society.
In my model new technologies that reduce voting costs, such as internet voting, have
the same eﬀect on ﬁscal policies as higher abstention costs.3 Hence they also lead to higher
rents and higher taxes, with the eﬀect on public goods provision being ambiguous. But at
least they have the advantage of lowering the voters’ costs on election day.
This paper contributes to three diﬀerent strands of the political economy literature.
First, it builds on the contributions of Baron (1994), Grossman and Helpman (1996, 2001),
and Persson and Tabellini (2000) on the role of campaign contributions in elections. Be-
cause of its focus on ﬁscal policies, my model is probably closest to Persson and Tabellini
(2000). The main diﬀerences to all these contributions are that I deviate from the assump-
tion of full (or random) voting participation, and that I do not take the share of informed
2This result is consistent with the ﬁnding of Wegenast (2010) that interest groups are less inﬂuential
in US states with highly educated and well informed citizens.
3Internet voting trials have been conducted in various countries, including France, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In Estonia all voters could use Internet voting
in the national election in 2007 (Alvarez et al., 2009).
3voters as exogenous. This allows me to show that compulsory voting makes campaign
contributions more important and, consequently, special-interest groups more powerful.4
Second, my paper contributes to the literature on the advantages and disadvantages
of compulsory voting. So far, there have been surprisingly few theoretical contributions
to this literature. Crain and Leonard (1993) consider the eﬀect of compulsory voting on
government spending in two distinct political economy models. In line with conventional
wisdom they hypothesize that compulsory voting would lead to higher public goods provi-
sion in a median voting model in which public goods provision is the only type of public
spending, and to less rents to special-interest groups in pressure groups theories of gov-
ernment. I improve upon Crain and Leonard (1993) by studying the eﬀects of compulsory
voting on public goods provision and rents in a formal and uniﬁed model. When looking
separately at public goods provision and rents, my model also suggests that compulsory
voting raises public goods provision in the absence of rents, and it is straightforward to
show that compulsory voting raises rents in the absence of public goods.5 More impor-
tantly, my model shows that when studying public goods provision and rents in a uniﬁed
framework, compulsory voting increases rents to special-interest groups while its eﬀect on
public goods provision is ambiguous.
B¨ orgers (2004), and Krasa and Polborn (2009) compare welfare under compulsory and
voluntary voting in costly voting models in which voters only beneﬁt from voting if they
4Str¨ omberg (2004) endogenizes the share of informed voters in a probabilistic voting model with proﬁt-
maximizing media. Other recent contributions building on Baron (1994), Grossman and Helpman (1996,
2001), and Persson and Tabellini (2000) provide a micro-foundation for the eﬀect of political advertisement
on voting decisions of imperfectly informed voters. In Prat (2002a, 2002b) political ads are non-informative,
but the amount spent on political ads serves as a signal of the candidates’ quality. In Coate (2004a, 2004b)
political ads are directly informative and the probability that the voters understand the information
increases in the amount spent on political ads. As I focus on the eﬀects of compulsory voting on ﬁscal
policies rather than on why and how political ads work, I build my model directly on Baron (1994),
Grossman and Helpman (1996, 2001), and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
5When abstracting from rents to special-interest groups (or taking them as exogenous), my model
further relates to Larcinese (2005) and Lind and Rohner (2008). They ﬁnd that public spending is biased
towards the rich because the poor are politically less informed. Uninformed citizens decide to abstain from
voting in Larcinse (2005), and they make more voting mistakes in Lind and Rohner (2008). In my model
uninformed citizens are both more likely to abstain and to make voting mistakes.
4are pivotal.6 These models focus on the voters’ participation decision and their choice
between two ﬁxed alternatives, thereby abstracting from the way candidates choose their
policy platforms and the role of special-interest groups, which are both at the heart of my
paper.
Third, this paper contributes to the literature on the eﬀects of constitutions and elec-
toral rules on ﬁscal policies. Persson et al. (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004)
focus primarily on the eﬀects of presidential versus parliamentary forms of government,
and proportional versus majoritarian electoral rules. I study an additional set of impor-
tant electoral rules, namely compulsory versus voluntary voting.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 ﬁrst presents and then
discusses the setup of my model. Section 3 derives the equilibrium and discusses the eﬀects
of changes in abstention and voting costs on ﬁscal policies and the citizens’ welfare. Section
4 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
There are two candidates, a lobby group, and a measure-one continuum of citizens. Each
candidate P ∈ {A,B} is oﬃce-motivated and chooses his policy platform to maximize
his winning probability pP, where pA + pB = 1. Platforms consist of public goods pro-
vision gP ≥ 0 and rent payments to the lobby group rP ≥ 0. These two components of
government spending are ﬁnanced with a linear income tax, and the government budget
must be balanced. Hence gP and rP determine the tax rate τP =
gP+rP
y , where y denotes
average income. Candidates may diﬀer in their policy platforms (gP,rP) as well as in some
predetermined, i.e., exogenous, positions.
6B¨ orgers (2004) mentions that such models are best suited to study elections with small electorates
as the probability that a particular voter is pivotal is close to zero in large electorates, e.g., in national
elections.
5The lobby group can make campaign contributions CA ≥ 0 and CB ≥ 0 to candidates
A and B at increasing marginal costs, and it receives rents rP from the elected candidate
P. Its utility is Π(rP,CA,CB) = J(rP) −
(CA+CB)2
2 , where J′(rP) > 0 and J′′(rP) < 0.
Citizens diﬀer in their skills αi, which may represent educational attainments or innate
abilities. The distribution of αi is given by F(αi), with continuous density f(αi) and
mean α. For simplicity I assume F(0) = 0, F(1) = 1, and f(αi) > 0 for all αi ∈
[0,1]. Skills αi have two eﬀects: First they determine citizen i’s income yi = αi. Second
they determine how costly it is for citizen i to acquire political knowledge qi ∈ [0,1]. I
assume that a citizen’s political knowledge qi measures the probability that she is informed
rather than impressionable, thus understanding the candidates’ platforms (gP,rP) and their
predetermined positions.
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The ﬁrst two terms on the right-hand side reﬂect citizen i’s utility from private consumption
ci
P = (1−τP)αi and public goods provision gP, respectively. I assume U′(ci








P) < 1, H′(gP) > 0, and H′′(gP) < 0. The third term, σi
P, represents
her utility from the predetermined positions of the elected candidate P. I assume that
σi = σi
B − σi





The fourth term captures beneﬁts and costs associated with voting. Ii is a dummy
variable whose value is 1 if citizen i participates in the election, and 0 if she abstains.
Some beneﬁts from voting may well depend on the voter’s political knowledge, like the
satisfaction of being conﬁdent to have voted in one’s own interest (Matsusaka, 1995).
These beneﬁts are βqi. For simplicity I set β = 1. The costs of completing and casting
one’s ballot are denoted by γ. These voting costs are relatively high when ballots must be
6cast at a polling station, but they may decrease if postal voting or even Internet voting
is introduced. Abstaining from the polls can also be costly: citizens may feel bad when
violating social norms and not fulﬁlling what might be perceived as a civic duty. The costs
from abstaining further increase when compulsory voting laws make voting a legal duty,
and when abstention may lead to a ﬁne or a request to explain the failure to vote (as in
Australia). The ﬁfth term, (1−Ii)δ, captures these various abstention costs. In our model,
new compulsory voting laws or stricter enforcement of such laws are thus represented by
an increase in δ.7 The last term captures the costs of acquiring political knowledge qi,
which are decreasing in skills αi.
Timing is as follows: First, the candidates choose their policy platforms (gP,rP). Sec-
ond, the lobby group can make campaign contributions. Third, elections take place. The
elected candidate then implements the announced platform.
It remains to describe the voters’ decisions.8 Informed voters vote for candidate A
if Wi,A ≥ Wi,B, and for candidate B otherwise. The electoral decisions of impressionable
voters are driven by political advertisements and policy irrelevant candidate characteristics.
The share of impressionable voters who vote for candidate A is 1
2 + ψ(∆C − η), where
∆C ≡ CA − CB.9 The remaining impressionable voters vote for candidate B. Note that
ψ > 0 measures the eﬀectiveness of advertisements and, therefore, campaign contributions;
and η is a popularity shock that is uniformly distributed in [−1
2λ, 1
2λ].
The appropriate solution concept for this sequential game is subgame prefect Nash
equilibrium.
7As shown later, an increase in γ and a decrease in δ have the same eﬀects on the citizens’ decisions
and equilibrium ﬁscal policies, but diﬀerent eﬀects on the citizens’ welfare.
8I use the term “voters” to refer to citizens who participate in the election.
9I could, e.g., assume that impressionable voter i votes for A if and only if ∆C > εi + η, with εi being




I now discuss some of the assumptions made. Utility function (1) implies that the citizens’
utility from private consumption ci
P and public goods provision gP is additively separable.
The model could be solved with more general utility functions, but assuming additive
separability simpliﬁes the analysis, and still allows for popular speciﬁcations such as the
quasi-linear preferences used by Persson and Tabellini (2000). What I need and want,
however, is for any given rP a negative relationship between a citizen’s skills αi and the
public goods provision gi
P that maximizes her utility. In my setting this relationship is
strictly negative if and only if RR(ci
P) < 1.10
Utility function (1) further implies that political knowledge qi beneﬁts voters because
they value the conﬁdence of having voted in their own interest, as suggested by Matsusaka
(1995). I could get very similar results if political knowledge had some direct consumption
value (like knowledge about sports), or if it had a positive eﬀect on expected (future)
income as in Larcinese (2005).11 In my model higher skilled voters will optimally acquire
more political knowledge because of lower information acquisition costs, which is consistent
with empirical evidence that voters with better education and higher incomes are better
informed (e.g., Lind and Rohner, 2008). Again, other mechanism ensuring that higher
skilled citizens acquire more political knowledge would serve my purpose equally well. In
Larcinese (2005), for example, the eﬀect of political knowledge on expected (future) income
increases in the citizens’ skills and income. Similarly, my results also do not depend on
the perfect correlation between incomes and political knowledge. A positive correlation is
however necessary.


























αH′′(gP ) , which is strictly negative if and only if RR(ci
P) < 1.
11In general, citizens also beneﬁt from political knowledge if they are pivotal with non-zero probability.
However, in my model where there is a continuum of voters this probability is always zero.
8Voting is probabilistic in my model, such that small changes in policy platforms (gP,rP)
only lead to small changes in the candidates’ winning probabilities pP. Following Grossman
and Helpman (1996, 2001) and Persson and Tabellini (2000), I model probabilistic voting
by assuming that candidates diﬀer in predetermined positions or some other exogenous
characteristics, and voters in their evaluation σi of these positions; and that a popularity
shock η aﬀects all (impressionable) voters.12 I further follow Persson and Tabellini (2000)
in assuming that σi and η are uniformly distributed with mean zero to get simple and
tractable functional forms of the candidates’ winning probabilities.
To capture lobbying in a simple way, I assume that there is only one lobby group, that
this lobby group cannot vote (or has measure zero), and that citizens do not beneﬁt from
rents rP. However I could derive similar results in a setting in which a non-negligible share
of the citizens belong to lobby groups, and in which all these citizens beneﬁt from rents
and can decide whether or not to participate in the election.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section I ﬁrst derive the decisions of the citizens and the lobby group, which yield
the candidates’ objective function. I then study how changes in abstention and voting
costs aﬀect the candidates’ policy platforms in two simpliﬁed versions of my model – one
with exogenous rents, and one with an exogenous tax rate. Finally I look at the complete
model introduced above, and I discuss how changes in abstention and voting costs aﬀect
the equilibrium policy platforms as well as the welfare of the citizens and the lobby group.
12Results are virtually the same when η aﬀects the decision of all voters as when it only aﬀects the
decision of impressionable voters.
93.1 Decisions of citizens and lobby group
I start by looking at the citizens’ decisions of how much political knowledge qi to acquire,
and whether or not to participate in the election. For citizens who abstain from voting
acquiring political knowledge has no beneﬁts. Hence they choose qi = 0. Citizens who
participate in the election choose qi to maximize qi −
q2
i
2αi. Hence they choose qi = αi.
Citizens therefore acquire political knowledge qi = αi and participate in the election if
αi − γ −
αi
2 ≥ −δ, i.e., if αi ≥ ˆ α ≡ 2(γ − δ), but they acquire no political knowledge and
abstain from voting otherwise.13 The election participation threshold ˆ α directly determines
voter turnout, which is 1 − F(ˆ α). Note that voting costs γ and abstention costs δ will
aﬀect equilibrium policy platforms exclusively through their eﬀects on ˆ α. For simplicity






marginal changes in γ and δ have an eﬀect on equilibrium policy platforms and voter
turnout.
I next derive the expected election outcome as a function of the candidates’ plat-
forms (gA,rA) and (gB,rB), and the campaign contributions CA and CB. Informed vot-
ers vote for candidates A if ∆V (αi) ≡ U(ci
A) − U(ci
B) + H(gA) − H(gB) > σi, and
for B otherwise. Among informed voters with skills αi ≥ ˆ α, the share voting for A
is therefore 1
2 + φ∆V (αi).14 By assumption, the share of impressionable voters voting
for A is 1
2 + ψ(∆C − η) for any αi ≥ ˆ α. As the share of voters with skills αi ≥ ˆ α






2 + αiφ∆V (αi) + (1 − αi)ψ(∆C − η)
 
f(αi)dαi, and the population share
who votes for B to πB = 1 − F(ˆ α) − πA. Candidate A therefore wins if and only if
13As a tie-breaking rule I assume that citizens who are indiﬀerent participate in the election.
14More generally, this share is min{max{0, 1
2 +φ∆V (αi),1}, but for simplicity I assume that it is always
strictly between zero and one. I make similar (implict) assumptions for all vote shares and winning
probabilities below.
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ˆ α αi∆V (αi)f(αi)dαi
ψ
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ˆ α αi∆V (αi)f(αi)dαi
ψ
  1
ˆ α(1 − αi)f(αi)dαi + λ∆C.
(2)
I now turn to the lobby group’s decision. The lobby group chooses campaign contribu-
tions CA and CB to maximize its expected utility pAJ(rA)+(1−pA)J(rB)− 1
2(CA +CB)2,
thereby anticipating the eﬀects of CA and CB on pA. The lobby group supports no can-
didate if rents rA and rB coincide, and the candidate promising more generous rents oth-
erwise. It is easy to see that the lobby group chooses CA = max{0,λ[J(rA) − J(rB)]}
and CB = max{0,λ[J(rB) − J(rA)]}, such that ∆C = λ[J(rA) − J(rB)]. Inserting this







ˆ α αi∆V (αi)f(αi)dαi
ψ
  1
ˆ α(1 − αi)f(αi)dαi + λ
2[J(rA) − J(rB)]. (3)
Candidate A anticipates the behavior of the lobby group and the citizens, and chooses
his ﬁscal policy platform (gA,rA) to maximize his winning probability pA. Candidate B
chooses (gB,rB) to maximize pB = 1−pA. It follows from equation (3) and the deﬁnition of
∆V (αi) that each candidate’s optimal platform is independent of his opponent’s platform,
















subject to gP ≥ 0, rP ≥ 0 and τP =
gP+rP
α ≤ 1, where Ω ≡
ψλ
φ . I assume throughout that
the solution to this problem is interior. As it is standard in this type of lobbying models,
the two candidates’ platforms therefore coincide in equilibrium, such that the lobby group
makes no campaign contributions even though the candidates oﬀer rents rP > 0.
113.2 Policy platforms when rents are exogenous (or absent)
I now look at a simpliﬁed version of my model in which rents rP are exogenous and equal
to r ∈ [0,α). This simpliﬁed version includes the special case in which there are no rents
and no lobbying.15 Hence it may be close to the model that some of the proponents of
compulsory voting have in mind, and it indeed helps to understand why compulsory voting
could potentially beneﬁt citizens with low incomes.
In this simpliﬁed version of the model the two endogenous ﬁscal policy variables, gP
and τP, are tied together by the government budget constraint. Hence candidates have
















P = (1 − τP)αi and τP =
gP+r
α . It follows:
Proposition 1 Assume rP = r. Then public goods provision gP and the tax rate τP
increase in δ and decrease in γ.
The intuition for these results is as follows. Higher abstention costs δ and lower voting
costs γ both lower the election participation threshold ˆ α, thereby increasing voter turnout
and lowering the average voter’s income as well as the average informed voter’s income.
Since voters with lower incomes prefer higher public goods provision gP (because RR(ci
P) <
1), the candidates respond to the lower income of the average informed voter by increasing
gp. Interestingly, however, even if ˆ α → 0, policy platforms remain biased towards citizens
with high incomes, with gP and τP still being relatively low. The reason is that candidates
only care about informed voters, and that the share of informed voters remains higher
among citizens with high incomes.
15Results are identical when assuming rP = 0 as when assuming Ω = 0. In the later case each candidate
would choose rP = 0, as rents have no eﬀect on his winning probability pP.
12I now brieﬂy turn to the welfare eﬀects of changes in γ and δ. The higher gP and τP,
which follow from an increase in δ or a decrease in γ, make citizens with low incomes better
oﬀ and citizens with high incomes worse oﬀ. Further, a decrease in γ is welfare improving
for all citizen who now decide to vote (no matter whether or not they would have voted in
the absence of this decrease), while an increase in δ is costly for all voters who would have
abstained otherwise (no matter whether they now vote or abstain). Loosely speaking,
compulsory voting therefore harms the rich who suﬀer from higher taxes τP, while the
welfare eﬀect on the poor is ambiguous as they beneﬁt from higher public goods provision
gP, but suﬀer from higher costs on election day, which may include the costs for acquiring
political knowledge.
3.3 Policy platforms when the tax rate is exogenous
I now look at a simpliﬁed version of my model in which the tax rate τP is exogenous and
equal to τ ∈ (0,1]. This simpliﬁed version may reﬂect the situation in countries in which
governments are substantially less constrained in how they allocate public spending than
in the amount they can spend. In addition, it nicely illustrates the main mechanism by
which compulsory voting can lead to policy changes that make all citizens worse oﬀ.
When τP is exogenous, the two endogenous ﬁscal policy variables, gP and rP, are again
tied together by the government budget constraint. Hence the candidates face a simple
trade-oﬀ between high public goods provision gP and high rents rP. From their perspective,
public goods are useful to increase electoral support from informed voters, while rents
are useful to increase campaign contributions and, thereby, the electoral support from













13with rP = τα − gP. It follows:
Proposition 2 Assume τP = τ. Then public goods provision gP increases in γ, but de-
creases in δ and Ω, while rents rP increase in δ and Ω, but decrease in γ.
To understand these results note that for a given tax rate, all citizens have the same
policy preferences: they want public goods provision gP to be as high as possible. Hence
incentivizing more citizens to go to the polls, e.g., by lowering voting costs γ or raising
abstention costs δ, would have no eﬀect on equilibrium policies if the new voters were
equally well informed as those who participated anyway. However these new voters are
less skilled and, therefore, acquire less political knowledge even when they participate in
the election. As a consequence the average voter’s political knowledge decreases. The
candidates optimally respond by increasing rents rP and lowering public goods provision
gP, as rents serve to win votes from impressionable voters while public goods serve to win
votes from informed voters. Not surprisingly, rents rP also increase in Ω, which measures
how sensitive the electoral support from impressionable voters is to changes in campaign
contributions relative to how sensitive the electoral support from informed voters is to
changes in policy platforms.
Hence, when the tax rate is exogenous, lower voting costs γ and higher abstention costs
δ lead to policy changes that beneﬁt the lobby group at the expense of all citizens. An
increase in δ further harms all those citizens who would have abstained in the absence of
such an increase, while lowering γ makes at least all voters better oﬀ. Ironically, compulsory
voting therefore harms its supposed beneﬁciaries, the poor, in multiple ways: it leads to
lower public goods provision as well as to higher costs on election day.
143.4 Equilibrium policy platform
In this section we derive the equilibrium of the complete model introduced in section 2 in
which public goods provision gP, rents rP and the tax rate τP =
gP+rP
α are all endogenous.
We know that in this case the candidates’ maximization problem is given by (4).
I discuss the eﬀects of voting and abstention costs on the three ﬁscal policy variables
in turn, starting with their eﬀects on the tax rate τP, which is proportional to the size of
government gP + rP:
Proposition 3 The tax rate τP and the size of government gP + rP increase in δ and Ω,
but decrease in γ.
Higher abstention costs δ and lower voting costs γ both lower the election participation
threshold ˆ α. There are two reasons why a lower ˆ α leads to a higher tax rate τP. First,
as seen in section 3.2, for any given rP, a decrease in ˆ α and the associated decrease in
the average informed voter’s income make it optimal for the candidates to choose a higher
tax rate τP. This puts some upward pressure on τP. Second, a decrease in ˆ α reduces the
share of informed voters among the voting population, because less skilled voters acquire
less political knowledge. A higher tax rate τP has the advantage that it allows to increase
gP or rP and, thereby, to raise electoral support from informed or impressionable voters,
respectively. But a higher τP has the disadvantage that it lowers private consumption ci
P
of all citizens. This, however, only reduces the electoral support from informed voters.
Hence when the share of informed voters decreases, the candidates become less concerned
about the disadvantage of high taxes, while the advantage of high taxes remains similarly
attractive. This puts additional upwards pressure on τP. Furthermore, the candidates
choose a higher tax rate τP when the support from impressionable voters becomes relatively
more sensitive to campaign contributions, i.e., when Ω increases.
I now turn to the eﬀects of voting and abstention costs on the rents rP paid to the
15lobby group:
Proposition 4 Rents rP increase in δ and Ω, but decrease in γ.
Some previous results are helpful to understand Proposition 4. We know from Proposition
2 that a decrease in ˆ α and the associated increase in the share of impressionable voters
increases rents rP relative to public goods provision gP for any τP; and from Proposition 3
that a decrease in ˆ α increases the tax rate τP. Hence higher abstention costs δ and lower
voting costs γ lead to more generous rents rP, because a higher share of impressionable
voters tilts both the size and the composition of public spending to the lobby group’s
beneﬁt. Proposition 4 further shows that rents rP increase in Ω, i.e., when the support
from impressionable voters becomes relatively more sensitive to campaign contributions.
I next discuss how voting and abstention costs aﬀect public goods provisions gP. There
are two countervailing eﬀects: First, candidates would like to choose higher gP when the
voting participation threshold ˆ α decreases, because the average informed voter then earns
a lower income and, therefore, prefers higher gP for given rP (as seen in Proposition 1).
Second, candidates would like to choose lower gP when ˆ α decreases, because informed
voters also care about low tax rates τP, with the marginal utility of τP being negative
and decreasing, and because the decrease in ˆ α already puts upwards pressure on τP by
increasing rents rP (as seen in Proposition 4). Any of these two eﬀects may dominate in
general. But for some speciﬁc utility function the net eﬀect is unambiguous:
Proposition 5 Public goods provision gP decreases in Ω. The eﬀects of γ and δ on gP
are ambiguous in general, but it holds:
(i) Assume U(ci
P) = χci
P with χ > 0. Then gP increases in δ and decreases in γ.
(ii) Assume RR(ci
P) = θ with θ → 1 (or θ = 1). Then gP increases in γ and decreases in
δ.
16Assumption (i) in Proposition 5 leads to quasi-linear preferences over ci
P and gP as in
Persson and Tabellini (2000). With these preferences, the marginal eﬀect of an increase
in τP on U(ci
P) becomes independent of the levels of ci
P and τP. Hence the second of
the countervailing eﬀects discussed above disappears, and the candidates choose higher gP
when ˆ α decreases due to an increase in δ or a decrease in γ.
Assumption (ii) in Proposition 5 ensures that the diﬀerences between the preferred
public goods provision gi
P of citizens with diﬀerent incomes converge towards zero. In
this case the ﬁrst of the countervailing eﬀects discussed above becomes negligible, and the
candidates choose lower gP when ˆ α decreases due to an increase in δ or a decrease in γ.
The same also holds true when RR(ci
P) = 1, as is the case with Cobb-Douglas preferences
in log form over ci
P and gP.
Proposition 5 further shows that the candidates choose lower public goods provision gP
when Ω increases, i.e., when the electoral support from informed voter becomes relatively
less sensitive to changes in policy platforms.
Finally, let us look at the welfare of citizens and the lobby group. The lobby group
only cares about high rents rP. As higher abstention costs δ and lower voting costs γ both
increase rP, these changes make the lobby group better oﬀ. Citizens prefer high public
goods provision gP and low tax rates τP, and the importance they assign to the former
relative to the latter decreases in their income. Higher δ and lower γ always increase τP,
while the eﬀect on gP is ambiguous. Hence, when higher δ and lower γ reduce gP, then
the policy changes following from these changes in abstention and voting costs make all
citizens worse oﬀ. But when higher δ and lower γ increase gP, then the welfare eﬀects of
the subsequent policy changes depend on the citizens’ income. Citizens with low incomes
are better oﬀ as they primarily care about high gP, while citizens with high incomes are
worse oﬀ as they primarily care about low τP. As discussed before, changes in abstention
and voting costs also have direct eﬀects on the citizens’ welfare: an increase in δ reduces
17welfare of all voters who would have abstained otherwise, and a decrease in γ increases
welfare of all citizen who now decide to vote. Taking these eﬀects together, it follows that
compulsory voting has an unambiguously negative eﬀect on the welfare of all citizens when
it reduces public goods provision gP. When it increases gP, then it harms citizens with
relatively high incomes, while its eﬀect on citizens with low incomes can be positive or
negative.
4 Conclusions
Conventional wisdom suggests that compulsory voting lowers the inﬂuence of special-
interest groups and leads to policies that are better for less privileged citizens, who often
abstain when voting is voluntary. To scrutinize this conventional wisdom, I have studied
how compulsory voting aﬀects public goods provision and rents to special-interest groups
in a probabilistic voting model with campaign contributions. This model is fairly standard
except that I allow the citizens to decide how much political knowledge to acquire, and
whether or not to participate in the election. I ﬁnd that compulsory voting increases the
share of uninformed voters, thereby making special-interest groups more inﬂuential. These
groups thus receive more generous rents under compulsory voting. In addition, I ﬁnd that
total government spending and taxes are higher under compulsory voting, while public
goods provision may be higher or lower. Compulsory voting may thus well lead to policies
that make even less privileged citizens worse oﬀ.
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i = 0. (7)
It is straightforward to show that the second-order condition holds. Denote the left-hand











f(αi)dαi < 0. Further
it follows from Leibniz’s rule that
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∂ˆ α = −ˆ α
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f(ˆ α), where (in slight















P) − 1] < 0, where the inequality follows from our assumption
that RR(ci
P) < 1 for all ci
P. It follows from condition (7) and ˆ α < 1 that −ˆ α
α U′(ˆ cP) +
H′(gP) > 0 and, consequently, that
∂kr
∂ˆ α < 0. The implicit function theorem then implies
∂gP





< 0. Further note that ∂ˆ α
∂γ > 0 and ∂ˆ α













∂δ > 0, which implies
∂rP
∂γ > 0 and
∂rP
∂δ < 0. ￿













i = 0. (8)
It is straightforward to show that the second-order condition holds. Denote the left-








ˆ α(1 − αi)J′(rP)f(αi)dαi < 0. Further it follows from Leibniz’s rule
that ∂kτ
∂ˆ α = −[ˆ αH′(gP) − (1 − ˆ α)ΩJ′(rP)] f(ˆ α). Observe that
∂[αiH′(gP)−(1−αi)ΩJ′(rP)]
∂αi =
H′(gP) + ΩJ′(rP) > 0. Therefore it follows from condition (8) and ˆ α < 1 that ˆ αH′(gP) −
(1−ˆ α)ΩJ′(rP) < 0 and, consequently, ∂kτ
∂ˆ α > 0. The implicit function theorem then implies
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∂Ω < 0 and
∂gp

















∂γ < 0 and
∂rP
∂δ > 0. ￿
































i = 0. (10)
It is straightforward to show that the second-order conditions hold. Denote the left-hand
side of (9) by k1, and the left-hand side of (10) by k2. It follows that
∂k1




∂rP = KU, and
∂k2





P)f(αi)dαi ≤ 0, KH ≡
H′′(gP)
  1
ˆ α αif(αi)dαi < 0, and KJ ≡ ΩJ′′(rP)
  1
ˆ α(1 − αi)f(αi)dαi < 0. Further it holds
that
∂k1
∂Ω = 0 and
∂k2
∂Ω > 0; and it follows from Leibniz’s rule that
∂k1
∂ˆ α = −[−ˆ α2
α U′(ˆ cP) +
ˆ αH′(gP)]f(ˆ α) and
∂k2
∂ˆ α = −[−ˆ α2
α U′(ˆ cP) + (1 − ˆ α)ΩJ′(rP)]f(ˆ α).
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We know that KJ < 0 and KH < 0, and it is easy to show that B > 0. Hence it remains
to determine whether the two terms in square brackets in (13) are positive or negative. As












0. It then follows from condition (9) and ˆ α < 1 that −ˆ α2












P)] − ΩJ′(rP) < 0
since RR(ci
P) < 1 implies U′(ci
P) + ci
PU′′(ci
P) > 0. It then follows from condition (10) and
ˆ α < 1 that −ˆ α2
α U′(ˆ cP) + (1 − ˆ α)ΩJ′(rP) > 0. Together with (13), these results imply that
∂(gP+rP)















∂γ < 0 and
∂τP
∂δ > 0.

























∂Ω > 0, where all inequalities directly follow
from results derived above. Consequently,
∂τP
∂Ω > 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4: This proof builds on various results derived in the proof of
Proposition 3. There I show that
∂rP
∂Ω < 0. Further I show that B > 0, KU ≤ 0, KH <
0, and −ˆ α2
α U′(ˆ cP) + (1 − ˆ α)ΩJ′(rP) > 0. Hence it follows from (12) that
∂rP
∂ˆ α < 0 if












i = 0. (14)
Observe that
∂[(1−αi)ΩJ′(rP)−αiH′(gP)]
∂αi = −ΩJ′(rP) − H′(gP) < 0. Therefore condition (14)
and ˆ α < 1 imply (1 − ˆ α)ΩJ′(rP) − ˆ αH′(gP) > 0. Consequently,
∂rP
∂ˆ α < 0,
∂rP
∂γ < 0 and
∂rP
∂δ > 0. ￿
21Proof of Proposition 5: This proof builds on various results derived in the proof of
Proposition 3, where I show that
∂gP
∂Ω ≤ 0.
Assume for the moment that U(ci
P) = χci
P with χ > 0. Then U′′(ci
P) = 0, such that
KU = 0. Hence equation (11) reduces to
∂gP
∂ˆ α = Bf(ˆ α)KJ
 
−ˆ α2
α U′(ˆ cP) + ˆ αH′(gP)
 
. It is
shown in the proof of Proposition 3 that B > 0, KJ < 0, and −ˆ α2
α U′(ˆ cP) + ˆ αH′(gP) > 0.
It follows that
∂gP
∂ˆ α < 0,
∂gP
∂γ < 0 and
∂gP
∂δ > 0.
Assume now that RR(ci








such that −ˆ α2
α U′(ˆ cP) + ˆ αH′(gP) → 0. Hence it follows from (11) that
∂gP
∂ˆ α → Bf(ˆ α)KU
[ˆ αH′(gP) − (1 − ˆ α)ΩJ′(rP)]. It is shown in the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 that B > 0
and ˆ αH′(gP) − (1 − ˆ α)ΩJ′(rP) < 0, respectively. Further, RR(ci
P) > 0 implies U′′(ci
P) < 0
and, consequently, KU < 0. It follows that
∂gP
∂ˆ α > 0,
∂gP
∂γ > 0 and
∂gP
∂δ < 0. ￿
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